Supreme Court Recognizes a “Ministerial Exception” to Employment Discrimination Laws

on Jan 12 in Discrimination tagged , , by Anthony Rao

Today the Supreme Court unanimously held in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (Jan. 11, 2012), that the First Amendment bars suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches when those ministers claim termination in violation of employment discrimination laws.  In doing so, the Court validated the “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination laws, a principle long-recognized by federal appellate courts across the country.

The case was initiated by Cheryl Perich, a teacher employed by a school run by a large Lutheran denomination in Michigan.  Perich taught mostly secular subjects but also completed the church’s requirements to become a “Minister of Religion, Commissioned,” including theological study, endorsement by her local district, and passage of an examination.   She also taught religion classes and led school-wide chapel services.  After Perich became ill with narcolepsy, the school contracted with a non-commissioned teacher to replace Perich.  Perich attempted to return to work, and threatened to file a lawsuit against the school when she was refused her former position.  Perich was later terminated and her title as minister was rescinded.  The EEOC filed suit against Hosanna-Tabor on her behalf, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file a disability discrimination lawsuit.

The question before the Court was whether the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment barred Perich’s suit.   Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the history of the Religious Clauses and the Court’s precedents regarding them barred the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.  The Court also agreed with every federal appellate court in the country that there was a “ministerial exception” to prevent the application of Title VII and other employment discrimination laws to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.  In this case, the Court held, Perich’s formal title and the religious functions she performed for the church made her a minister covered by the ministerial exception.

The Court rejected the EEOC’s argument that religious organizations can defend against employment discrimination claims by invoking their First Amendment right to freedom of association.  As Chief Justice Roberts noted, “The Court cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.”  The Court found that the issue in this case, “government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself,” warranted the application of the ministerial exception.  While finding that the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation, the Court declined to “adopt a rigid formula” for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.

In concurring opinions, Justices Thomas and Alito offered two different approaches to the question of which employees may qualify as ministers.  Justice Thomas stated that the First Amendment requires courts “to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister” to apply the ministerial exception.  In contrast,  Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, urged courts to “focus on the function performed by persons who work for religious bodies,” rather than relying solely on the use of the term “minister,” because different religions use the term “minister” in different ways (and some do not use the term at all).

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